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Does Land Tenure Insecurity Drive Deforestation in the Brazilian 
Amazon?  
Summary  
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the detrimental impact of land tenure insecurity 
on deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. It is related to recent controversies about the 
detrimental impact of land laws on deforestation, which seem to legitimize land 
encroachments. The latter is mainly the result of land tenure insecurity which is a key 
characteristic of this region and results from a long history of interactions between rural social 
unrest and land reforms or land laws. A simple model is developed where strategic 
interactions between farmers lead to excessive deforestation. One of the empirical 
implications of the model is a positive relationship between land tenure insecurity and the 
extent of deforestation. The latter is tested on data from a panel of Brazilian Amazon 
municipalities. The negative effect of land tenure insecurity proxied by the number of 
squatters on deforestation is not rejected when estimations are controlled for the possible 
endogeneity of squatters. One of the main policy implications is that ex post legalizations of 
settlements must be accompanied by the enforcement of environmental obligations. 
Keywords: Deforestation, land tenure insecurity, squatters, panel data analysis, Brazil. 
JEL Classification: Q23; Q15 
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1.  Introduction 
Deforestation rates of Brazilian Amazon in the last decades have been a growing 
environmental concern. According to official sources, between 1988 and 2008, average 
annual deforestation rates in Brazilian Amazon were 18.2 thousand square kilometer or 0.36 
percent of her geographic area, approximately (INPE 2008).  Though there was a significant 
decline since 2005, future trends will largely depend on the capability of Brazilian 
environmental policies to restrain the market forces driving the expansion of the agricultural 
frontier in the region.  
Brazilian environmental policies have used a host of instruments to encourage forest 
preservation. Chiefly among them is a 1996 legislation that increased legally required reserve 
areas (reserva legal) in forest areas in Amazon from 50% to 80% of the agricultural 
establishments area (farms under 100 ha were exempted, however). Another policy instrument 
implemented was the establishment of several national parks and forests, extractivist and 
biological reserve areas, as well as the recognition of Indian territories, each of them subject 
to diverse kinds of restrictions in what concerns economic activities and their deforestation 
impacts. Apart from the efficiency considerations that can legitimately be raised, the 
government capability  to enforce both regulatory instruments is weak when confronted with  
economic and political strength of the main drivers of  deforestation (Alston & Mueller 2007).  
The drivers of deforestation have been the subject of many theoretical and empirical 
studies (e.g. Andersen et al. 2002; Binswanger 1991; Margulis & Reis 1991; Pfaff 1999). The 
immediate causes of deforestation are usually related to the development of transport 
infrastructure and its impact on the profitability of agro-pastoral and logging activities. At 
broader levels, studies also highlight the roles played by macroeconomic factors like the 
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economic growth performance,  real exchange rates, and foreign debt (e.g. Arcand et al. 2008; 
Barbier & Burgess 2001; Foster & Rosenzweig 2003),  as well as by structural factors such as 
demographic pressures, rural poverty and landownership concentration, among other factors 
(Barbier 2001; Andersen et al. 2002; Koop & Tole 2001; Walker et al. 2000). 
Institutions and in particular weakly defined property rights in land are other structural 
factors that play a key role in the tropical deforestation process (Alston et al. 2000; Angelsen 
1999; Angelsen 2007; Araujo et al. 2009; Deacon 1994; Mendelsohn 1994). The reason is that 
poorly enforced property rights discourage investments in long term assets such as forests 
which do not yield immediate returns. The land tenure insecurity makes agricultural land less 
subject to encroachment than forest areas, thus increasing rates of return in agricultural 
activities viz-à-viz  sustainable exploitation of forests.   
This paper analyzes the role played by land tenure insecurity on the process of 
deforestation of Brazilian Amazon. Section 2 describes the Brazilian Amazon institutional 
framework in what concerns the enforcement of property rights in land.  In section 3, an 
heuristic model develops several consequences of land tenure insecurity on deforestation. In 
section 4, these consequences are corroborated on a panel data set constituted by the 
municipalities of the Amazon. Land tenure insecurity is a missing variable and thus the ratio 
of agricultural establishments hold by squatters over the total number of agricultural 
establishments is used as a proxy measure. 
2.  The Brazilian institutional background 
The notion that technology and institutional arrangements in agrarian societies are 
determined by the relative scarcity of land and labor is a classical hypothesis in economics 
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(Domar 1970). The historical development of Brazilian agriculture is a fertile ground for this 
hypothesis (Reis & Reis 1988). Indeed, land abundance - defined both by the large 
availability of land in relation to population and by the open access to land property in frontier 
areas - was certainly one of the most important historical features shaping the technology and 
institutions of the Brazilian economy. Thus, the rise of Brazilian slavery in the 15th c. can be 
explained as the institutional solution which made feasible the emergence of a rentier class in 
a context of land abundance. Indeed, rent was derived from the ownership of labor, the scarce 
factor, not from land property. The elastic supply of African slaves up to the mid-19th c. led to 
the consolidation of a traditional plantation system based upon slash-and-burn shifting 
cultivation and the continuous incorporation of new lands. For the Brazilian agrarian structure 
one of the main consequences was the extreme concentration of landownership which persists 
up to present day. Correlated to that, landowners were able to secure the virtual monopoly of 
political power for at least three centuries (Carvalho 2006) and as a consequence, Brazilian 
legal tradition became extremely lenient with the appropriation of public lands and precluded 
most of the governments’ attempts to demarcate regulate and enforce property rights in land.  
Property rights in land were largely established through non-market illegal mechanisms which 
in most occasions led to the use of individual coercion and violence (de Carvalho Franco 
1969; Dean 1971; Dean 1997; Guedes 2006) 
For the Brazilian environment, the outcome was the clearing of most of the Atlantic 
forest in the Northeast, South and Center-South regions of the country by the end of 19th c. 
(Dean 1997; Furtado 1971). The agricultural settlement of the Center-West and North regions 
bringing with it the deforestation of the Amazon forest was postponed to the second half of 
the 20th c. when the building of highways made feasible the inland connection with the rest of 
the country. In historical perspective, Amazon deforestation is thus the last stage of the 
expansion of the Brazilian agricultural frontier. Table 1 presents evidence on the evolution of 
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the agrarian structure of Brazilian Amazon and its impact on deforestation since 1970. The 
figures show that most of the agricultural settlement of the region took place in the last 30 
years. In 1970, the area under private farms represented only 12% and deforestation 7% of the 
geographic of the region. In the same years, almost 50% of the farm holders were squatters 
(posseiros) which had no legal land tenure whatsoever, while farm holders with property titles 
represented less than 27% of establishments. As the settlement of the region progressed the 
share of squatters naturally declined but, in 1996, they still represented 26% while proprietors 
represented 64% of farmers (Map 1). Regionally, squatters were quite important in the states 
of Maranhão, Amazonas and Acre where they represented, respectively, 43%, 33% and 30%.  
Figures in Table 1 also show that throughout the whole period landownership concentration 
was extreme with values of Gini coefficient close to 0.9.  
Insert Table 1 and Map 1 
At present, however, the region is still very much characterized by land abundance and 
an open access institutional context. According to IBGE, as late as 2006, as percent of the 
geographic area, private farms represented 25%; areas under legal protection of the federal or 
the state governments including units of conservation (national forests or parks, extractivist 
and ecological reserves, etc.) and Indian territories represented 29%; and the remaining 45% 
were public wastelands without any kind of demarcation or regulation of uses.  
The Land Statute of 1964 (Estatuto da terra) gives the landless peasants the right to 
settle on undeveloped public or private lands. According to a subsequent law adopted in 1980, 
squatters who have been developing an area of land during five consecutive years without 
opposition of landowners can claim formal property title over this area. If squatters are 
evinced, they can obtain compensation on behalf of landowners for all improvements made to 
the lands. Moreover, the 1988 Constitution and the Agrarian Law of 1993 stated that 
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unproductive establishments may be taken over and redistributed to landless and rural 
workers (Fearnside 2001). The Brazilian land reform institute (INCRA: Instituto Nacional de 
Colonizaçao e Reforma Agraria) is in charge of landowners’ expropriation and land 
redistribution. Until the mid-eighties, land redistributions were scarce. They consisted mainly 
of installations of families on public lands within the framework of colonization projects. 
Land redistributions increased at the end of the eighties, and resulted mainly from squatters’ 
invasions of large private holdings, rather than public lands, and ex post legalization. The 
number of expropriations and settlements by INCRA has been increasing significantly from 
the mid nineties with the development of occupations of large private landholdings by 
landless peasants organizations (Pacheco 2009) in particular the MST (Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra).  
This process of land redistribution generates land tenure insecurity on land plots that do 
not fulfill a socio-economic function especially on forestlands. Indeed, the 1988 Constitution 
does not provide a clear definition of underdeveloped land. In practice, forestlands are 
considered as unused so that landowners are encouraged to clear the forest to prevent 
squatters’ invasions. Conflicts between landowners and squatters are exacerbated (Alston et 
al. 2000) and fuel deforestation.  
3.  An heuristic model of deforestation 
We develop a heuristic model which proposes a plausible story of deforestation in an 
institutional context characterized by land tenure insecurity and open accessed land. This 
model adds to the substantial game theoretic literature modeling the “micro-level” drivers of 
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deforestation.1,2 A body of this literature establishes a link between agrarian structure and 
deforestation. Bulte et al. (2007) develop a lobbying model which explains how rural 
subsidies are bribed and favor large scale extensive agriculture thus leading to larger 
deforestation. Large scale extensive agriculture and deforestation may also be linked by 
insecure property rights. Angelsen studies strategic interactions in land appropriation between 
the State and local communities, as well as between farm holders (Angelsen 2001; Angelsen 
2007). Hotte (2001) describes the conflict that arises between first settlers and contestants 
which expand agricultural land at the expense of forested areas. Another body of the literature 
draws on the analysis of decision-making in common-pool resources (Alix-Garcia et al. 2005; 
Ligon & Narain 1999).  
Our heuristic model belongs to this literature, positing the existence of farmers 
competing for land holdings and taking into account the open access / common property 
character of forests and forest produces and local external effects generated by clearing 
activities as well.  
                                                 
1
 Game theoretic macro-models of deforestation introduce players, i.e. northern and southern 
countries, which consider forest as a public good, derive different pay-offs from forest 
conservation and have to negotiate. These models are not discussed here; we rather 
concentrate on models where agents play at the local level. Examples of such game theoretic 
“macro-models” of deforestation are for example: Fredj et al. (2004); Martín-Herrán et al. 
(2006); Sandler & Sargent (1995) 
2
 Angelsen & Kaimowitz (1999) provide a wide review of micro models of deforestation. 
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3.1 The setting of the game 
The model is built on the intuition that farm holders i (i = 1, …, A) can claim a plot of 
forested area Ti. They can either clear and convert it for agriculture or cattle activities (Ni) or 
leave it as forested area (Fi). 
iii NFT +=            (1) 
The choice of Ni is influenced by the usual determinants of agricultural and cattle 
profitability such as prices and costs. Clearing forest especially in the Brazilian context, is 
also a way to enforce land property (Alston et al. 2000; Araujo et al. 2009) thus giving more 
incentives to forest clearing. Forest generates benefits while providing firewood or building 
materials, and non-timber forest products (NTFP) which can be considered as insurance 
substitutes (Delacote 2007). Forest benefits accruing to farm holders may also be described in 
terms of ecosystem benefits which are hardly divisible.  
To formalize clearing behaviors it is posited that a farm holder chooses Ni considering 
other farmholders’ forest clearing Nj (j ≠ i) as given and maximizes his profit (pii): 
( ) ( )NNCFNR iiiii
N i
~
,;,max −θ=pi  i∀ =1, …, A      (2) 
Such that equation (1) holds together with the following equalities: ∑
=
≡
A
j
jNN
1
~
and j ≠ i 
and ∑
=
≡
A
i
iFF
1
. N~ denotes the other agents’ total forest clearing; F is the total amount of 
forest providing non divisible goods and services. Ri is the agricultural net receipt function; Ci 
represents forest clearing costs. 
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Parameter θ denotes all influences on forest clearing decisions: farm holder’s factors or 
“environmental” factors. θ reflects (i) endowments in natural assets; (ii) institutional features 
that condition land property insecurity and (iii) economic factors that are related to state 
development level, federal macroeconomic policies and international factors that influence 
agricultural profitability as well. When considering the total amount of land i.e. ∑
=
≡
A
i
iTT
1
 
equation (2) becomes: 
( ) ( )NNCNNTNR iiiiii
N i
~
,
~
,max −−−=pi  i∀ =1, …, A     (3) 
Such that equation (1) holds. 
3.2 Forest clearing external effects 
The receipt function Ri(.) depends positively on cleared areas catching positive and non 
increasing marginal agricultural profits: 0>iNR  and 0≤
i
NNR . Natural forest also maintains 
soil fertility of cleared areas through nutrient, micro-climate, hydrological - purification of 
water, soil moisture - effects as well as pollinations (Durieux et al. 2003; Moegenburg & 
Levey 2002; Peters et al. 1989; Rodrigues et al. 2009). Consequently the receipt function Ri(.) 
of agent i depends positively on forested areas: 0>iFR .  
Deforestation, however, can generate externalities in specific contexts. When agents cut 
forests, natural forest becomes scarcer and its value or implicit price increases: 0≤iFFR . It is a 
“natural forest scarcity effect”1 which reduces all agents’ incentives to cut the forest. 
                                                 
1
 Natural forest scarcity effects are also alluded as forest ecosystem effects (Rodrigues et al. 
2009; Satake et al. 2007) 
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Moreover, algebraically, the following equality holds iFF
i
FN
i
NF RRR −==~  which may be given 
additional pieces of explanation. For example, maintaining forested areas in upper lands, 
benefits to farm holders in lower lands, either individually i.e. 0≥i FN iR  or collectively i.e. 
0~ ≥i FNR . We can therefore interchangeably consider the following agricultural receipt cross 
derivatives: 0~ ≥−== iFF
i
FN
i
NF RRR .  
The cost function Ci(.) represents forest clearing costs of agent i. It is assumed to behave 
the usual way with respect to its own level of deforestation i.e. be twice differentiable, 
increasing, and convex in forest clearing: 
0>iNC , 0≥
i
NNC   i∀  = 1… A        (4) 
The cost function not only depends on the agent’s own deforestation level but also on 
the other players’ one. Their effects are given by i NNC ~  which is the second cross derivative 
between agent’s i forest clearing and other agents’ forest clearing. When a farmer starts 
clearing the most profitable plots of land, he generates an “agricultural land scarcity effect” 
(Angelsen 1999) which rises up agent i’s clearing costs: 0~ ≥i NNC . Profitable agricultural areas 
are scarce since their availability depends on infrastructure provision, cleared land natural 
fertility, importance of flooding areas, or prevalence of diseases as well.2 
                                                 
2
 This scarcity effect may however be contradicted by a “frontier effect”. Indeed, it can be 
argued that deforestation facilitates encroachments of other agents into the natural forest thus 
generating a local positive externality for agent i whose clearing costs are reduced: 0~ ≤i NNC . 
Bringing new plots into cultivation induces investments in transport infrastructures of which 
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3.3 Equilibrium 
Let us consider the first-order necessary (FONC) and second order sufficient (SOSC) 
conditions for profit maximization for the agent i assuming that there exists a unique interior 
solution:3 
FONC: ( ) ( ) ( ) 0~,,, =−− NNCFNRFNR iiNiiFiiN       (5) 
SOSC: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0~,,,2, <−+− NNCFNRFNRFNR iiNNiiFFiiFNiiNN  ⇔ 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0~,,3, <−+ NNCFNRFNR iiNNiiFFiiNN        (6) 
The first two terms of the first order condition (equation 5) give the agricultural receipt 
of an extra unit of cleared forest. It is equal to the difference between the marginal agricultural 
profit and the marginal receipt of natural forest. This difference is assumed to be positive. The 
third term is the marginal cost of forest clearing.4 
The FONC shows that there exists an implicit relationship between the deforestation of 
agent i and the deforestation of other agents written: ( )NGN ii ~=  where Gi is the response 
                                                                                                                                                        
costs are shared by local authorities or by the State. The story of Brazilian agrarian 
institutions and deforestation may justify that the frontier effect first dominated but 
progressively vanished with respect to the agricultural scarcity effect. 
3
 If Ni maximises pii, then a global and unique maximum is reached provided that the objective 
function is strictly concave. Moreover, it is assumed that an interior solution is obtained i.e. 
equation (1) holds. 
4
 In other words the marginal profit of clearing is equal to the natural forest’s implicit price 
which can be considered as a hotellinian scarcity rent: ( ) ( ) ( ) 0~,,, >−= NNCFNRFNR iiNiiNiiF .  
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function of agent i. The existence of Gi is guaranteed by the SOSC (equation 6) and the 
implicit function theorem. The slope of Gi is obtained after totally differentiating the FONC: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )NNCFNRFNRFNR
NNCFNRFNR
Nd
dN
ii
NN
ii
FF
ii
FN
ii
NN
ii
NN
ii
FF
ii
NF
i
~
,,,2,
~
,,,
~
~
−+−
+−
=     (7) 
The latter equation simplifies into: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )NNCFNRFNR
NNCFNR
Nd
dN
ii
NN
ii
FF
ii
NN
ii
NN
ii
FF
i
~
,,3,
~
,,2
~
~
−+
+−
=  
The sign of the denominator is negative (SOSC). Thus, the slope of the response 
function depends on the sign of the numerator: 
( ) ( )( )NNCFNRsign
Nd
dN
sign ii NN
ii
FF
i
~
,,2
~
~+−−=  
The numerator is positive when scarcity effects are taken into account. In that case, the 
response function is downward sloping: the more the other agents clear the forest, fewer 
agents i clear. Forest clearing decisions are strategic substitutes. 
Insert Figure 1 
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3.4 Discussion 
Static comparative exercises are with respect to A and θ. The symmetric equilibrium is 
located in C (Figure 1) where the response function of the player i ( )NG ~  intersects the 
symmetric condition line A = 1, 2… where: 5 








−
= ∑
=
A
j
ji N
A
N
11
1
  Ai ,,1K=∀  and j ≠ i       (8) 
When the number of farm holders A increases, the symmetric condition line rotates 
clockwise around O. Hence, the Cournot-Nash deforestation rate equilibrium is a positive 
function of the number of farm holders or agricultural establishments.6 This result mimics the 
classical finding of the literature according to which overexploitation of an open access 
resource is exacerbated by the number of agents in competition (e.g.Cornes & Sandler 1996).7  
Moreover, forest clearing depends on θ : 
                                                 
5
 Under the assumption that the players share the same characteristics, the unique Cournot-
Nash symmetric equilibrium is stable when the slope of the response function of the agent i is 
less than 1 in absolute value (sufficient condition, e.g.Tirole 1990, p.220). 
6
 The unique Pareto optimal solution is independent of the distribution of the deforestation 
rate between the farm holders and of the number of farm holders. Hence, the optimal solution 
is the curve EE’ of which slope is –1 (Figure 2).  
7
 This expression is preferred to the so-called Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968). See 
for instance: Baland & Platteau 1996; Bruce 1998; Feeny et al. 1990 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )NNCFNRFNRFNR FNRFNRddN iiNNiiFFiiFNiiNN
ii
F
ii
N
i
~
,,,2,
,,
−+−
+−
=
θ
θθ
 thus 
( ) ( )( )FNRFNRsign
d
dN
sign iiF
ii
N
i
,, θθ +−−=θ
 
θ represents among other factors land tenure insecurity. It is assumed here that property 
rights insecurity which can either decrease marginal receipts generated by forested areas i.e. 
( ) 0, ≤θ FNR iiF  or increase marginal agricultural receipts ( ) 0, ≥θ FNR iiN  as well. In the 
Brazilian context, an increase in land tenure insecurity creates additional forest clearing 
incentives. Put differently, an increase in land tenure insecurity decreases the marginal 
receipts of forested areas with respect to agricultural ones. Forested lands are more subject to 
land invasions than agricultural ones. In brief, θ catches the effects of land distribution on 
forested areas that have been considered as underdeveloped areas. 8 
                                                 
8
 This static comparative exercise allows taking into account the effect of development levels 
measured by gross domestic products. During the first stages of development, an increase in 
gross domestic products which is represented by an increase in θ, is detrimental to natural 
forests since the demand for agricultural products is important: ( ) 0, ≥θ FNR iiN . Afterwards, 
an increase in gross domestic products favours the demand for environmental services 
generated by forests: ( ) 0, ≥θ FNR iiF .  
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4.  Assessing the influence of squatters on deforestation: 
econometric analysis of Amazon deforestation  
4.1 Data set and variables 
The main sources of data are the agricultural censuses (Censo Agropecuario) realized in 
1985 and 1995 by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE: Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). The data are collected for each agricultural 
establishment which can be a household or a firm, private or public, with different land tenure 
status: landowner, tenant, sharecropper or squatter. Data are aggregated at the municipal level 
and the sample used in the econometric analysis is restricted to the municipalities of the  
Amazon.9 Changes in the number and area of municipalities required to group the 763 
municipalities in 258 Minimum Comparable Areas (MCA) for consistent comparisons in 
time. The panel set is thus constituted by 516 observations. 
Following Andersen et al. (2002), the proxy for deforestation is the land cleared for 
agro-pastoral purposes. Cleared land is measured as the areas used by the agricultural 
establishments for annual or perennial crops, planted forests or pastures, short and long 
fallows. The remaining areas are considered as non cleared: natural forests, natural pastures, 
non usable lands. Cleared land is divided by the MCA area (cleared land) and is presented in 
Table 2. The most deforested areas are located in the states of Goias, Tocantins, Maranhao 
                                                 
9
 To be precise the sample of municipalities used refer to the so-called Brazilian Legal 
Amazon which is an administrative area defined for regional development purposes including 
the states of Rondonia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Para, Amapa, Tocantins, Mato Grosso, and 
parts of Maranhão and Goias (a very small part in the latter).  
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and Mato Grosso which cover the “arc of deforestation” along the southern and eastern edges 
of Amazon. 10 
[Insert Table 2] 
The explained variable is Cleared land. From the heuristic model presented above, the 
number of agricultural establishments in the MCA (Nbets) and the ratio of agricultural 
establishments hold by squatters over the total number of agricultural establishments 
(Squatters) have a positive impact on deforestation. Control variables can be added such as 
the real gross domestic product per capita (Gdpp) and its square. This specification is 
consistent with a deforestation Kuznets curve (Barbier & Burgess 2001; Barbier 2004). Gross 
domestic product is estimated by the Institute for Applied Economics Research (IPEA: 
Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Applicada). The GDP data are expressed in 2000-Reais 
using the national accounts implicit GDP deflator.  
The econometric estimation is driven in three steps of which results are presented in  
                                                 
10
 Only 79% of Amazon is naturally forested (cf. Andersen et al. 2002, chap.2). For instance, 
in the southern and eastern parts of Amazon, the land is naturally covered with savannah and 
agricultural conversion cannot be considered as deforestation. To deal with this potential 
source of bias another measure of deforestation is used. Cleared land is weighed by the share 
of naturally forested land in each municipality (corrected cleared land). Municipalities that 
are not naturally forested are excluded from the sample. The naturally forest cover data come 
from IBGE. Naturally forested land are areas of low density forests, seasonal forests, dense 
forests, river banks, mangroves and swamp forests. Econometric results are available upon 
request. 
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Table 3: (i) Ordinary Least Squares estimation (OLS – column 1) where all observations 
are pooled; (ii) Panel Least Squares estimation (PLS – column 2) with double fixed effects 
that control for municipal and temporal heterogeneities and (iii) Panel Two-Stage Least 
Squares estimation (PTSLS – columns 3 to 5) with double fixed effects and a control for the 
endogeneity of Squatters.  
4.2 Results  
Insert Table 3 
The OLS estimation (Table 3: 1) displays a negative and significant correlation between 
Cleared land and Squatters. Two sorts of biases can however be suspected. Significant 
explanatory variables which also affect Squatters might be omitted. For example, economic 
policies changes at the federal level (liberalization of the agricultural sector) or international 
price variations may have an impact both on deforestation and on the number of squatters. 
Moreover time invariant municipality characteristics (geographical and physical) may also 
affect both Cleared land and Squatters.  
The PLS estimation (Table 3: 2) includes MCA and temporal fixed effects that are 
jointly significant. The coefficient of Squatters is not statistically different from zero. This 
result suggests that the OLS estimation bias induced by omitted variables is negative. There 
may be a positive correlation between the number of squatters and the distance of the 
municipality from the main urban centers. Indeed it may be easier for squatters to claim land 
in remote areas where land is cheaper and property rights harder to enforce. In the same time, 
the profitability of deforestation decreases with the distance from the main urban centers 
(Alston et al. 1996).  
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The PLS result could be the consequence of the endogeneity of Squatters which is dealt 
with the PTSLS estimator. This instrumental variable estimator is justified in three ways: (i) 
Squatters is only a proxy variable of land tenure insecurity. Hence, the induced attenuation 
bias must be corrected by using instrumental variable. (ii) The instrumentation also protects 
against the consequence of omitted variables which are correlated with the number of 
squatters. For instance, squatters may be characterized by a high time preference that could 
fuel deforestation. (iii) A simultaneous bias can affect the OLS estimations. They may be 
more difficult for squatters to settle in a municipality where deforestation has been more 
intense insofar as land property rights are more secure on agricultural lands. 
Squatters is instrumented by the number of agricultural establishments owned by 
churches (Church) and by public entities (Public) divided by the total number of agricultural 
establishments in the MCA. The Church variable is considered as a proxy of the influence of 
the church in the MCA. In Brazil, churches and especially the Catholic Church play an active 
role in defending the interests of landless people (Carter 2002). In 1975, the Catholic Church 
created the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT: Comissão Pastoral da Terra), which supports 
the action of various landless movements. The CPT defends the land reform, denounces 
landowners’ violence against squatters and provides material and legal assistance to squatter 
camps. In 1984 CPT actively participated to the foundation of the Brazil’s Landless Workers 
Movement (MST).  
The instrumental equations (Table 4) highlight the positive and significant effect of 
Church and Public on Squatters. It is assumed that public and churches’ establishments have 
the same technology and incentives to clear the forest as other agricultural establishments. 
The Church variable is thus considered as a pertinent instrument which only has an indirect 
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effect on deforestation through the Squatter variable.11 Concerning the Public variable, it is 
assumed that the enforcement of property rights in public establishments is weaker than in 
private ones. Public establishments are potentially more the subject of squatters’ invasions 
since public lands are usually considered as underprotected.  
[Insert Table 4] 
The Nakamura and Nakamura test (Table 3: 3 to 5) rejects the exogeneity of Squatters 
and the test of Sargan (Table 3: 5) does not reject the null hypothesis that the 
overidentification restriction is valid. The partial Shea-Godfrey R2 excludes the weak 
instruments bias. 
The effect of Squatters on deforestation in the PTSLS equations (3) and (5) becomes 
positive and significant whatever the instrument list. The magnitude of the marginal impact of 
Squatters on deforestation is different according to the instrument list but remains positive 
and significant. Deforestation responds strongly to a decrease in the relative importance of the 
squatter ratio with an elasticity calculated of 0.82 between 1985 and 1995  
The theoretical model also predicts a positive relationship between the number of 
agricultural establishments (Nbets) and Cleared land. The estimated elasticity of deforestation 
with respect to the number of agricultural establishments lies between 0.44 and 0.59. The 
                                                 
11
 It can be noticed that there is no statistical link between the density of population and the 
relative number of church owned agricultural establishments. Hence, this instrument does not 
catch a demographic effect and (or) an urbanization effect on deforestation. Moreover the 
church and public variables cannot be suspected to be correlated with squatters’ 
characteristics. 
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control variables Log(Gdpp) and Log(Gdpp)2 deliver a non linear effect of the development 
level of the MCA on deforestation. The turning point is relatively high and only 7% of the 
observations are located beyond it. This result does not differ from existing empirical 
literature which generally refers turning point estimates that are significantly higher than 
average incomes (Barbier & Burgess 2001). For most observations, an increase in Gdpp has a 
positive impact on deforestation: a 1% increase in Gdpp implies a 0.39% increase in 
deforestation. This positive impact can be interpreted as the consequence of the improvement 
in infrastructures that is tightly correlated with economic development, especially in Brazil 
(e.g. Andersen et al. 2002).12  
In Amazon, cattle ranching is considered as a main factor of deforestation and an 
increase in the profitability of this activity is expected to promote deforestation. The cattle 
price is introduced in the PTSLS equation (Table 3: 4) to take this effect into account. This 
price is supposed to be exogenous i.e. local markets are supposed to be integrated to the 
national market. In this case, controlling for the double fixed effects implies that the 
variability of cattle prices catches idiosyncratic transaction costs, e.g. transport costs, between 
local exporting markets and a central market. A cattle price increase thus corresponds to a 
decrease in transport costs that generates an increase in the profitability of cattle ranching and 
favors deforestation. The variable Log(cattle price) has a significant and positive impact on 
deforestation and does not affect the other coefficients. 
                                                 
12
 Deforestation may generate income streams that are taken into account in GDP measures. 
Nevertheless, gross domestic products depend on the overall economic activity. We thus 
assume that the exogeneity of Gdpp may be a reasonable hypothesis when pertinent 
instruments are missing. 
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5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper analyses the effects of land tenure insecurity on the process of deforestation 
of Brazilian Amazon. Land abundance, squatter settlements, and landownership concentration 
coupled with land tenure insecurity, violence and deforestation, are deep rooted institutional 
features of Brazilian history. In recent decades, the picture was aggravated by land reform 
initiatives taken by the governments and the political mobilization of landless peasants. The 
last stage is the Amazon frontier where, on top of the equity issues, trade offs are aggravated 
by environmental concerns. The main thesis of this paper is that deforestation is dramatically 
featured by the land tenure insecurity. A simple model is derived from this peculiar 
institutional framework. The decisions of agents are modelled in a game theoretic framework 
characterized by strategic substitutability in deforestation decisions. The main econometric 
result is obtained on a municipal panel data set where land tenure insecurity is approximated 
by the number of squatters. Taking into account the potential endogeneity of this variable, our 
result corroborates the detrimental effect of land tenure insecurity on deforestation in the 
Brazilian Amazon.  
The theoretical framework is obviously a simplification of complex relationships 
between numerous factors involved in the deforestation process. However the results evidence 
a limit of the Brazilian state-led land reform which can raise environmental concerns. Though 
land reform may be promoted on equity and efficiency grounds, a legal framework which 
implicitly recognizes deforestation as a proof of land development is socially costly. 
Environment preservation imposes to recognize that natural forest is not an “ineffective” use 
of land. Until recently however some mechanisms contained in new land regulations of 2009 
seem to impediment conservation incentives: they allow among other things that maximum 
sizes of ex post legalization of land is extended from 100 to 1,500 hectares or that 3 years 
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after legalization, lands over 400 hectares can be sold, thus fueling the land market and 
thereby deforestation.  
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7.  Tables, Maps and Figures 
Table 1. Evolution of the agrarian structure and deforestation from 1970-2006 in Brazilian 
Amazon: Evolution of the agrarian structure and deforestation from 1970-2006 
Year  Number of 
farms 
Farm area 
(% of 
geographic 
area)  
Deforested 
area (% of 
geographic 
area) 
Forest area 
inside farms 
(% of 
geographic 
area)  
Number of 
squatter farms (% 
of farms)  
Gini index of 
farm size 
1970 673,715 12.2 7.0 4.6 47.8 0.90 
1975 851,463 15.5 8.5 7.0 49.1 0.92 
1980 920,399 20.5 11.3 9.2 39.5 0.90 
1985 1,059,274 22.7 12.4 9.2 34.6 0.89 
1995 822,488 23.8 13.1 9.9 26.1 0.88 
2006 na 25.0 15.2 9.3 na na 
Source: IBGE 
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Map 1. Number of agricultural establishments hold by squatters in Brazilian Amazon, 1970 
and 1995, percentages 
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Table 2. Cleared land in percentage of the state area (cleared land) 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1995 
Acre 1 1 3 3 5 
Amazonas 0 1 1 1 0 
Amapa 0 1 1 2 1 
Goias 21 35 46 48 54 
Maranhao 16 19 26 29 21 
Mato 
Grosso 
3 6 10 13 22 
Para 3 3 6 7 7 
Rondonia 2 2 4 7 17 
Roraima 0 0 1 1 3 
Tocantins 9 12 17 22 26 
Total BLA 3 4 6 8 10 
Source: IBGE 
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Table 3. Estimation results (explained variable: Log[cleared land]) 
 OLS  
(1) 
PLS  
(2) 
PTSLS  
(3) 
PTSLS  
(4) 
PTSLS  
(5) 
Constant -2.71*** 
(-4.28) 
-6.91*** 
(-8.44) 
-6.53*** 
(-7.85) 
-6.18*** 
(-5.78) 
-6.86*** 
(-8.61) 
Log(Nbets) 0.21** 
(2.54) 
0.61*** 
(5.44) 
0.44*** 
(3.61) 
0.34** 
(2.20) 
0.59*** 
(5.42) 
Squatters -3.29*** 
(-8.84) 
0.13 
(0.57) 
2.88*** 
(2.97) 
3.65*** 
(2.56) 
0.50** 
(2.31) 
Log(Gdpp) -0.47** 
(-2.44) 
0.28*** 
(3.13) 
0.39*** 
(3.66) 
0.43*** 
(3.72) 
0.29*** 
(3.26) 
Log(Gdpp)² 0.06 
(0.60) 
-0.12*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.13*** 
(3.36) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.12*** 
(-3.06) 
Log(cattle price)    0.43** 
(2.06) 
 
Number of observations 516 516 516 472 516 
Adjusted R² 0.17 0.91 0.85 0.78 0.91 
Cross-section/Period 
Fixed effects (F) P-value 
 Yes 
(0.00)*** 
Yes 
(0.00)*** 
Yes 
(0.00)*** 
Yes 
(0.00)*** 
Instrument list   Log(Nbets) 
Log(Gdpp) 
Log(Gdpp)² 
Church 
Log(Nbets) 
Log(Gdpp) 
Log(Gdpp)² 
Log(cattle price) 
Church 
Log(Nbets) 
Log(Gdpp) 
Log(Gdpp)² 
Church Public 
Exogeneity test (P-value)   0.0001 *** 0.00 *** 0.06 * 
Shea-Godfrey partial R2 
Overidentification test (P-
value) 
  0.40 0.40 1.05 
0.91 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to observation specific heteroskedasticity in the 
disturbances (White diagonal correction). *: significant at 10 % level; **: significant at 5 % 
level; ***: significant at 1% level 
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Table 4. Instrumental equations (explained variable: Squatters) 
 PLS PLS 
Constant -0.13 (-0.67) 0.00 (0.02) 
Log(Nbets) 0.06** (2.21) 0.03 (1.53) 
Log(Gdpp) -0.04 (-1.59) -0.03 (-1.43) 
Log(Gdpp)² 0.00 (0.40) 0.00 (0.02) 
Church 2.63*** (4.39) 2.28*** (3.83) 
Public  0.91*** (15.14) 
Cross-section and period Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations  516 516 
R² 0.77 0.88 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to observation specific heteroskedasticity in the 
disturbances (White diagonal).  
Figure 1. Farm holder i’s response function with negative externalities (scarcity effects) 
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